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Abstract
Advances in cyber capabilities continue to cause apprehension among the public. With states engaging in cyber operations
in pursuit of its perceived strategic utility, it is unsurprising that images of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” remain appealing. It is
crucial to note, however, that the offensive action in cyberspace has only had limited success over the past decade. It is
estimated that less than 5% of these have achieved their stated political or strategic objectives. Moreover, only five states
are thought to have the capabilities to inflict or threaten substantial damage. Consequently, this raises the question of
what accounts for the continued sense of dread in cyberspace. The article posits that this dread results from the inap-
propriate use of cognitive shortcuts or heuristics. The findings herein suggest that the lack of experience in dealing with
cyber operations encourages uncertainty, which motivates decision-makers to base their judgements on pre-existing, and
possibly incorrect, conceptions of cyberspace. In response, the article segues into potential solutions that can mitigate
unsubstantiated dread towards cyberspace by peering into the role that attributes at the organizational level can play in
tempering the position of individuals. The suggested considerations are rooted in the interactions between the micro and
macro level processes in forming judgments, sensemaking, and ultimately, mobilizing actions.
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1. Introduction
On Friday, May 12, 2017, the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service (NHS), Spain’s Telefonica, and other enti-
ties were incapacitated by theWannaCrymalware which
infected over 200,000 computers in nearly 150 coun-
tries (R. Goldman, 2017). In 2001, Code Red exploited
vulnerabilities leading to the infection of over 300,000
computers (Perrone, 2001). In 2003, Slammer initiated a
denial-of-service attack and stalled Internet traffic while
compromising approximately 75,000 computers within
ten minutes (Boutin, 2003). These events reinforce nega-
tive perceptions towards cyber threats, yet overstate the
scope of the problem. Anderson et al. (2013) note that
the actual cost of cybercrime is much lower than that
reported by the private sector or the media. Expound-
ing on this argument, Jardine (2015, 2017) notes that
malicious activity in cyberspace is far less likely to occur
when viewed relative to the growth of the domain and
when vulnerable actors are disaggregated and studied
in isolation. More closely related to this article, Maness
and Valeriano’s (2016) study highlights that out of 68
states with cybersecurity programs, only five (5) demon-
strated the capability to inflict noteworthy damage. Fur-
thermore, less than 5%of these operations have resulted
in behavioural changes on the part of the target as in-
tended by the aggressor. Consequently, this raises the
question as to why dread continues to persist as a re-
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sponse to cyber operations (Jarvis, Macdonald, & Whit-
ing, 2017).
Dread is defined in this article as the apprehension
of the negative consequences of an event. This percep-
tion of dread in cyberspace is often attributed to in-
creasing technological dependence and the strategic ex-
ploitation by state actors. The literature analyses this
phenomenon mainly through the lens of rational choice
theory, while underemphasizing individual cognitive pro-
cesses (Dean & McDermott, 2017; Edwards, Furnas, For-
rest, & Axelrod, 2017; Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015). Conse-
quently, this article explores dread in response to cyber
operations as a reflection of heuristic usage resulting in
sub-optimal judgements.
Using two vignette survey experiments, it forwards
three main arguments. First, the lack of experience and
the novelty of this threat generates an environment of
uncertainty with respect to cyber operations (Gigeren-
zer, 2008; Hafenbradl, Waeger, Marewski, & Gigeren-
zer, 2016; Kruglanski, Orehek, Dechesne, & Pierro, 2010).
Second, judgmental errors that facilitate elevated levels
of dread are not suggestive of irrationality but rather
stem from the use of inappropriate cognitive strategies.
Finally, errors may be tempered by attributes defined at
the organizational level.
Before proceeding with the rest of the article, it
should be noted that the results do not serve to explicitly
identify the use of a specific heuristic. Rather, heuristic
usage is inferred from the level of dread demonstrated
by participants and suggests that the use of these strate-
gies in this context merits further inquiry.
2. Framing Cyber Threats
A cyber threat, in the context of this article, is an ex-
pectation of harm to a political body through the mali-
cious manipulation of cyberspace which reduces its ca-
pability to meet strategic, political, or economic objec-
tives (Creppell, 2011). While threat conceptualizations
vary, these are dependent on the domain’s technological
characteristics. Increased dependence on cyberspace el-
evates a society’s exposure to potential threats, and con-
sequently, the perception of dread brought by unfore-
seen consequences (Hansen&Nissenbaum, 2009; Kuehl,
2009). Furthermore, its growth coincides with Perrow’s
(2011) claim that complexity and interdependency result
in normal accidents that emerge from the inherent char-
acteristics of systems—compounding attempts to secure
the domain. Experience, however, has proven less conse-
quential. In 2010, Stuxnet affected nearly a third of Iran’s
nuclear centrifuges; yet damage did not exceed expected
operational wear-and-tear (Lindsay, 2013). Likewise, dis-
ruption to segments of Ukraine’s power grid in 2015 re-
quired the exploitation of interdependent systems but
only resulted in temporary disruption (Zetter, 2016).
Given its coercive intent, aggressors failed to achieve
their objectives despite the exploitation of these valu-
able systems1 (Iasiello, 2013; Maness & Valeriano, 2016).
Besides its technological fragility, the domain’s strate-
gic value also enjoys attention (Dunn Cavelty, 2012).
Specifically, its perceived offensive advantage reflected
by its low cost of entry and the difficulty of defending
against aggressors is thought to serve as an equalizer
within the international system (Lawson, 2013). For in-
stance, the availability of tools stands in contrast with
how hard it is to defend against aggressors. Conse-
quently, weaker powers may offset their material dis-
advantage through cyberspace (Valeriano & Maness,
2014). Moreover, offensive acts are thought to be eas-
ier than defensive acts, further emboldening aggressors
(Edwards et al., 2017).
No actor, however, has met its objectives by cyber
means alone (Iasiello, 2013). Its low cost of entry is pro-
portional to the expected gains (Pytlak & Mitchell, 2016;
Slayton, 2017). While disruptive events require minimal
effort, degradative operations demand substantial in-
vestments on the part of the aggressor. This is due to the
organizational demands of an effective offensive cam-
paign that is often overlooked in favour of technological
considerations (Buchanan, 2017; Rid & Buchanan, 2015;
Slayton, 2017). Consequently, this weakens arguments in
favour of a cyber offensive-advantage. In addition, the ev-
idence also illustrates restraint on the part of aggressors
with their actions occurring below thresholds that are
likely to result in escalation (Valeriano & Maness, 2015).
Despite its suggested exceptionalism, cyberspace
remains subject to systemic, organizational, and ma-
terial constraints such that operations have, thus far,
achieved limited gains (Healey, 2016; Iasiello, 2013; Law-
son, 2013; Sheldon, 2014). Yetwhether one ascribes it to
one or all of the above reasons, empirical evidence has
yet to account for the continued sense of dread (Jarvis
et al., 2017).
3. A Case for Cognitive Heuristics
The previous section suggests that a degree of irrational-
ity influences judgements vis-à-vis cyber operations. As-
suming the uniformity of the underlying technologies2
and the move towards greater societal dependence,
these deviations cannot be justified solely by techno-
logical or systemic variations. A classical understand-
ing of rationality requires that decision-makers possess
knowledge of all possible alternatives. Such conditions
are rarely met and result in bounded rationality where
individuals operate as satisfiers rather than optimizers
(Dawes, 1979; De Neys, Rossi, & Houde, 2013; Kahne-
man, 2003; Thompson, Turner, & Pennycook, 2011).
Extending this argument further, Savage (1972) la-
bels conditions of perfect information as small worlds,
1 Stuxnet did not result in the discontinuation of the Iranian Nuclear Programme and the Ukraine attack did not shift the balance of the conflict in favour
of Russia.
2 A similar sense of dread has occurred in response to novel technologies. It is crucial to note that cyberspace is not exceptional in this case.
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distinguishing these from large worlds where judge-
ments informed by rational choice cannot be presumed
to be the correct response. Research demonstrates that
strategies that deviate from normative models are pre-
ferred when conditions with less than or almost per-
fect information exist (Binmore, 2008). The resulting
less-is-more effect challenges the convention of rational
cognition and brought renewed interest to the concept
of heuristics.
Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011, p. 454) define
heuristics as a strategy that “ignores part of the infor-
mation, with the goal of making decisions more quickly,
frugally, and/or accurately thanmore complex methods”.
Although the classical approach to heuristics emphasizes
its propensity to generate sub-optimal judgements, sat-
isfactory results are possible when the strategy exploits
the statistical characteristics of the information environ-
ment (Gigerenzer, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2010; Mar-
tignon & Hoffrage, 1999).
The information environment plays a crucial role in
making judgements. Assuming that information is read-
ily available, the introduction of free parameters is un-
problematic. This, however, is rarely the case. Most envi-
ronments wherein judgements concerning future events
are crucial involve large worlds in which relevant infor-
mation is unknown or uncertain and is derived from
a small sample. The introduction of additional parame-
ters to improve fit risks the introduction of noise. Con-
sequently, normative strategies such as expected utility
are disadvantaged.
4. Cyberspace: A Very Large World
Heuristicsmay outperformnormative strategies in uncer-
tain environments. While it may be counterintuitive to
assert that judgements regarding cyberspace are best ap-
proached through this frugal process, its characteristics
are better aligned with the notion of a large rather than
a small world.
4.1. An Uncertain Domain
Cyberspace is unpredictable. While its history is marked
by efforts to reduce uncertainty, these do not eradi-
cate the effects of increased complexity that limit predic-
tive accuracy. Consequently, the significance of offensive
or defensive acts cannot be fully anticipated (Farrell &
Glaser, 2017).
The growth of technologically-driven solutions does
not abolish the challenge of uncertainty. First, additional
information does not translate to a generalizable view
of threats. Although cyberspace operates on pre-defined
rules3, the interconnection between components varies
by function. Relying on public threat information gen-
erated from a limited sample does not adequately cap-
ture this reality. Second, trust in automated systems to
collect, identify, and model threats aggravate the prob-
lem of overfitting. These systems are dependent on pre-
existing signatures, the development of which is left to
individuals or organizations with a limited worldview
and are unable to capture the full spectrum of threats.
Finally, efforts to reduce bias through increased infor-
mation sharing and exchange4 is problematic. The ex-
change of information is non-obligatory and active par-
ticipants share similarities in terms of technology and
worldview. Moreover, the integrity of such information
cannot be guaranteed.
4.2. Limited Experience
Cyber operations that significantly affect a state’s strate-
gic interests or normal day-to-day life are rare. This in-
frequency provides decision-makers with a limited sam-
ple from which to generalize. Valeriano and Maness
(2014), for instance, identified less than fifty (50) in-
stances where cyber threats inflicted noticeable dam-
age to critical infrastructure. Judgements emerging from
these may not reflect reality. Furthermore, efforts to
increase the availability of threat intelligence, as men-
tioned above, may increase the volume of information,
but not necessarily its quality.
In reference to Slovic’s (2016) model of risk percep-
tion, events that are both uncertain and exhibit the po-
tential (real or imagined) for catastrophe increase the
level of dread. Translating this into the realm of politics,
decision-makers operating in an uncertain environment
with incomplete information tend to over-estimate risks
associatedwith events such as the threat posed by an ad-
versarial state (Jervis, 2017). Note, however, that while
research has shown that appropriate judgements may
still emerge using heuristics. This, however, is contingent
on its fit with the existing information environment—
also knownas a heuristic’s ecological rationality (Gigeren-
zer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
4.3. Constraints on Ecological Rationality
While the characteristics of cyberspace make it an ideal
candidate for heuristic use, the selected heuristic must
be able to exploit the environmental structures of un-
certainty, sample size, redundancy, and variability in cue
weights (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). The environmental
structures of redundancy and variability in cue weights
are of particular interest for this article. The former refers
to the correlation between cues or the extent to which
two or more sources of evidence are related to one an-
other. For instance, to what extent does the ability to
compromise the banking system in Country A indicate
the vulnerability of the same country’s power generation
facilities? Relatedly, the variability of cue weights deter-
3 The underlying components of cyberspace interact with the aid of pre-defined architectures (e.g., the Von Neumann architecture common to most
modern-day computers) and protocols (e.g. Hypertext Transfer Protocol, HTTP).
4 In the form of crowd-sourced threat intelligence such as the Open Threat Exchange (OTX).
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mines whether the relevance of these cues is normally
distributed or skewed. Building on the previous exam-
ple, to what extent would Country B’s banking system be
vulnerable if that of Country A was exploited? Although
heuristics have been proven to outperform more delib-
erate strategies, the ability to discern these characteris-
tic is crucial for this task. Failure to do so results in eco-
logically irrational strategies being selected that, in turn,
leads to inappropriate judgements.While factors such as
time-pressure, cognitive resources, and pre-existing bias
hinder the ability to select ecologically rational strategies,
this article is interested primarily in the enabling role of
domain expertise with respect to cyberspace (Kruglanski
& Gigerenzer, 2011).
Although cyberspace appears monolithic to laymen,
its inner workings are greatly segmented. Such abstrac-
tion is crucial to allow individuals to exploit its func-
tionality for their professional or day-to-day tasks. How-
ever, attempts to explain its finer points have resulted
to the use of analogies that poorly explain the function-
ing of this domain and which have resulted in many mis-
conceptions amongst the public (Betz & Stevens, 2013;
E. Goldman & Arquilla, 2014). While simplification aids
communication, it limits the ability to form sound judge-
ments which could otherwise emerge in light of a better,
if not complete, understanding of cyberspace. Authors
such asHansen andNissenbaum (2009) have cited knowl-
edge discrepancies between experts and non-experts as
the source of alarmism over cyberspace. Similarly, a re-
cent study of media articles covering cyber operations
has found no difference in how threats are perceived
between different states and those that occur domesti-
cally (Jarvis et al., 2017). In the earlier example, if both
power generation (Country A) and banking (Country B)
used identical systems and were equally vulnerable then
heuristics such as “Take the Best”wouldwork just aswell,
if not better, than more deliberate cognitive strategies
(Gigerenzer, 2008). However, expertise gained through
experience or formal training would prompt decision-
makers to recognize the differences between these sys-
tems resulting in the use of more ecologically rational
strategies. Taken collectively, questions concerning the
lack of experience and expertise towards cyber opera-
tions leads to two key propositions:
(a) Hypothesis 1: Limited of experience with cyber opera-
tions creates an environment of uncertainty resulting in
the use of cognitive heuristics.
(b) Hypothesis 2: The absence of domain knowledge in cy-
berspace prompts the selection of inappropriate heuris-
tics resulting in elevated levels of dread.
5. Experimental Design
5.1. Operationalization and General Design
To demonstrate the role of heuristics, the article im-
plements a 2×2 between-group vignette survey exper-
iment (Auspurg & Albanese, 2015; Rousseau & Garcia-
Retamero, 2007; Sniderman, 2011). The treatment is ap-
plied through the manipulation of Internal and External
variables that reflect positive or negative events. For the
purposes of this experiment, these events are cyber op-
erations targeting a state’s power generation facilities.
These are made to vary slightly with respect to their
cause, impact, and time, and to reflect the uncertainty
of the informational environment. Participants are also
denied information regarding other events besides that
of a second state’s experience with a cyber operation.
These are meant to operationalize the concept of un-
certainty and limited experience which is crucial to the
above framework. Furthermore, the countries depicted
in the vignette are portrayed as being nearly identical
to one another in terms of their usage of cyberspace.
No specific information is provided regarding the specific
technologies used or how they vary. This is intended to
stimulate the participant’s knowledge of cyberspace and
operationalizes the concepts of redundancy and variabil-
ity, which entails that those with greater knowledge of
the domain ought to be able to recognize the possible
differences that may exist. These characteristics meant
that both hypotheses could be tested.
Before reading the vignette, participants responded
to a set of questions to measures their trust in cy-
berspace to act as a control for pre-treatment effects.
The questionnaire is based on Jian, Bisantz and Drury’s
(2000) measure of trust in automated systems. This is
followed by the vignette in which the participants are in-
structed to evaluate the extent to which they perceive
cyberspace as threatening. Threat is measured with a
10-point Likert scale.5 The baseline value is five (5), which
suggests a neutral perception of the domain.6 Higher val-
ues indicate elevated levels of dread while lower values
reflect its absence.
The choice to operationalize the concept of dread
as the threatening (or not) nature of cyberspace is
grounded in the vernacular understanding of a threat.
A threat may be an indication of something impending
(e.g. threat of a blackout). In the context of the vignette,
this is presented as the threat of the negative conse-
quences of a cyber operation. Analytically, this is equiva-
lent to Slovic’s (2016) notion of dread which is viewed
as the apprehension of the negative consequences of
an activity.
5 The Likert scale is a widely used instrument for measuring a participant’s attitude in survey research. For more information, refer to the Sage Research
Methods webpage (Lavrakas, 2008).
6 As there is no available baseline as to the “appropriate” level of dread, this value was deemed appropriate given the objectives of the study.
7 An Internet-based platform for recruiting participants specifically for research.
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5.2. Participant Recruitment
Participants were recruited through Prolific7. While con-
cerns regarding data quality from Internet sources per-
sist, no significant difference has been found with re-
spect to experiments investigating cognitive processes
(Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Crump, McDonnell, &
Gureckis, 2013; Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti,
2017). Special care, however, is required as participants
are often less engaged with the experiment. Conse-
quently, two attention check questions are included such
that failing one requires the removal of a participant.
The participants consist of university students di-
vided into two groups. The first are those pursuing de-
grees in Computer Science and related disciplines while
the second are those who do not have the same ed-
ucational background. The former represents “domain
experts” while the latter are viewed as “domain non-
experts”. Participants are then randomly assigned to one
of four versions of the vignette. Given the absence of
methodologically similar research for this problem do-
main, the authors assumed a moderately large effect
size (f = 0.3). Consequently, a minimum sample size
with appropriate statistical power (1 − 𝛽 = 0.8) was es-
timated at 90.8 It ought to be noted that the results con-
tained herein are valid with respect to the samples used
and are therefore not immediately generalizable. Repli-
cations studies are necessary before more generalizable
conclusions are made.
6. Experimental Results
6.1. Experiment 1: Domain Non-Experts
The first experiment recruited 202 participants. Of these,
50.99% (103) were female and the remaining 49.01%
(99) were male. Issues concerning engagement were en-
countered leading to the removal of 27.72% (56).9 To en-
sure a balanced analysis, random samples were drawn
based on the size of the smallest treatment group re-
sulting in 120 samples with thirty (30) samples per treat-
ment group.
Analysis reveals that 65.9% (79) of participants began
the experiment with a distrust of cyberspace while the
remaining 34.1% (41) indicated that they either trusted
the domain or held no preference. The mean for Threat,
however, does not suggest an elevated sense of dread
(x = 5.5, baseline = 5.0).
To determine the effect of Trust and the absence
or presence of External and Internal events on Threat,
a blocked factorial Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)10
was performed. For this analysis, the effects on Trust
(i.e. Positive, Negative, Neutral) was controlled for
through blocking.
The results of the experiment shows a significant
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) due to the External,
F(1,114)= 10.33 and Internal F(1,114)= 7.37 treatments
as well the pre-existing level of Trust F(2,144) = 4 on
Threat at the p < 0.05 level.11 A Post Hoc comparison
reveals that the main effects are significant at p < 0.05.
The presence of an External event had a main effect of
1.34 on Threat. An Internal event, on the other hand,
had a main effect of 1.13. Finally, Trust had a signif-
icant main effect of 1.27 between Positive and Nega-
tive groups. No significant interactions were observed in
this experiment.
6.2. Experiment 2: Domain Experts
The second experiment recruited 166 participants. Of
these, 22.29% (37) were female and the remaining
77.71% (129) were male. Issues concerning engagement
were encountered leading to the removal of 32.53% (54).
To ensure a balanced analysis, random samples were
drawn based on the size of the smallest treatment group
resulting in 112 samples with twenty-eight (28) samples
per treatment group.
Analysis reveals that 50.89% (57) of participants be-
gan the experiment with a distrust of cyberspace while
the remaining 49.11% (55) indicated that they either
trusted the domain or held no preference. The mean for
Threat, however, does not suggest an elevated sense of
dread (x = 5.71, baseline = 5.0). To determine the ef-
fect of Trust and the absence or presence of External and
Internal events on Threat, a blocked factorial ANOVAwas
performed. For this analysis, the effects to Trustwas con-
trolled for through blocking.
The analysis does not reveal a significant ATE of the
Internal, or Trust treatments on Threat at the p < 0.05
level12. External F(1,106) = 2.72, p = 0.06, however, had
a barely significant main effect on Threat. A Post Hoc
comparison illustrates that there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference across different treatment groups in
terms of Threat for this given experiment. No significant
interactions are observed in this experiment.
7. General Discussion
7.1. Non-Experts and Motivated Reasoning
The results indicate that dread is not noticeably elevated
for domain non-experts (x = 5.5). When comparisons
8 The approximation that 90 participants are necessary to ensure that the findings were not simply the result of chance and that the treatment has
resulted in a valid and observable effect.
9 Studies concerning the lack of attention on Internet-based platforms suggest that attrition can be as high as 50%. A rate less than 30% exceeds expec-
tations (Peer et al., 2017).
10 A collection of statistical techniques used to analyze the difference of means between groups. For further information, refer to Introduction to Analysis
of Variance (Turner & Thayer, 2001).
11 Effect Size (Cohen’s f): Trustf = 0.265; Externalf = 0.301; Internalf = 0.254.
12 Effect Size (Cohen’s f): Trustf = 0.206; Externalf = 0.187; Internalf = 0.136.
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are made between treatment groups, however, a differ-
ent picture emerges. Treatment groups exposed solely to
External events (x = 5.7, p = 0.044) and those that ex-
perienced both External and Internal events (x = 6.7,
p = 0.0) reflect elevated and statistically significant lev-
els of dread in comparison to the control (x = 4.167).
While the design of the experiment does not per-
mit the identification of specific cognitive heuristic, it al-
lows one to infer the possible processes involved. For
groups in which negative External and Internal events oc-
curred, the imagery of an extended period of power loss
experienced by a similar country is set in the memory
of the participant. The participant is then informed of a
similar event taking place in their hypothetical country—
resulting in an emotional association between the two
events. This process of emotional association has been
identified as a cornerstone of motivated reasoning in
which decision-makers strive to maintain cognitive con-
sistency with respect to their existing beliefs (Jervis,
2017). Furthermore, these beliefs are self-reinforcing
with later experiences confirming or strengthening one’s
position on the matter (Holmes, 2015; Mercer, 2010;
Roach, 2016). Yet this association may not be depen-
dent solely on the debilitative experience of a third-party.
The existing levels of Trust by participants may have also
played a role.
For treatment groups experiencing only negative Ex-
ternal events, the mean of Threat was 2.2 points higher
for participants who distrusted cyberspace (p = 0.01).
This similarity in direction between Trust and Threat
suggests an association between the two, which may
have led participants to use the former to inform their
judgements. Unfortunately, this process is not observed
in cases where both External and Internal events are
negative in nature where the difference due to Trust is
only 0.8 points (p = 0.5). This does not discredit ear-
lier arguments.
The level of dread may have been a manifestation
of motivated reasoning—the need to believe in the dan-
gers of cyberspace. But the emotional association may
have been caused by the recency effect (Krosnick, Li, &
Lehman, 1990). When participants are asked to evalu-
ate the level of Threat, those exposed to negative Inter-
nal events begin their associated memory search with
theirmost recent experience. If a negative External event
had recently been shown, the recency effect could re-
sult in an association forming between the two. In its
absence, participants would have to extend the search
of their stored memory which may include pre-existing
trust in cyberspace.
The above process also accounts for the absence of
elevated levels of Threat (i.e. negative Internal event
only). Prior to applying the Internal treatment, partic-
ipants are informed that “domestically, your country,
like others, occasionally experiences trouble with crim-
inals in cyberspace who target individuals and small
to medium-sized enterprises for financial gain”. Conse-
quently, it is possible that participants form an associa-
tion with this statement. The absence of a negative Ex-
ternal event reinforces the benign nature of cyberspace
as other countries with seemingly similar characteristics
have not encountered problems. Additionally, the simi-
larity in the levels of Threat irrespective of Trust rules
the latter out as a source of association. Finally, the lack
of difference between the level of Threat of this group
and that of the control suggests that the participants per-
ceive the situation as routine.
7.2. Motivated Reasoning and Inappropriate Strategies
The presence of motivated reasoning in the formation
of judgement does not necessarily result in sub-optimal
outcomes. The literature on motivated reasoning iden-
tifies two modes of thinking: accuracy-oriented and
goal-oriented (Kunda, 1990; Taber, Lodge, & Glathar,
2001). The former assumes that individuals will engage
in more deliberate and cognitively demanding process-
ing to reach the best conclusion. The latter, in contrast,
motivates individuals tomaintain pre-determined beliefs
resulting in selective information processing which rein-
forces existing biases.
With respect to the article, the situation in the vi-
gnette is framed such that it encourages a goal-oriented
mindset. Participants play the role of an appointed elite
with no apparent accountability to the public. Moreover,
there are no explicitly stated consequences that may re-
sult from bad judgement (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Fur-
thermore, the stereotypical use of External and Internal
events (as well as Trust) suggests an attempt to maintain
pre-existing beliefs by building associations (specified in
the vignette or from past experience) to serve as refer-
ence points to assess the current state of cyberspace.
The representativeness heuristic is employed when
making judgements in uncertain environments. When in
use, individuals resort to the comparison of salient fea-
tures exhibited by objects or events (Kahneman, 2011).
In the experiment, participants appear to draw similar-
ities between their hypothetical country and others re-
garding the use of cyberspace and its corresponding vul-
nerability as well as between the situation presented in
the vignette and their own pre-existing notions concern-
ing cyberspace (i.e. Trust).
A cursory evaluation of the vignette encourages read-
ers to identify and find similarities between the countries
being discussed. Both hypothetical countries invested in
and enjoyed the economic benefits of ICT. For those
that experienced negative External and Internal events,
both had their power plants affected to varying degrees.
A few assumptions may be made given these. First, ICT
(and in turn cyberspace) is a monolithic and homoge-
nous construct. Second, all power plants that depend
on these technologies are vulnerable. Third, these vul-
nerabilities can easily be exploited. Finally, the conse-
quences of such a compromise are predictable. These
raise questions whether the redundancy and variability
of cues within the information environment were suffi-
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ciently recognized by the participants. Failure to do so re-
sults in the selection of ecologically irrational strategies
and accounts for the observed level of dread.
As logical as these propositions may be, they fail
to grasp certain realities. Indeed, cyberspace is by no
means a homogenous entity. While these technologies
do share commonalities that allow for integration, they
retain enough individual characteristics to make each
unique. For instance, while both Windows and Unix sys-
tems share common protocols, a vulnerability in the for-
mer is not necessarily shared by the latter. And even
if a vulnerability is found to exist, it is not a confirma-
tion of its exploitability. Both intent and capabilities need
to exist for this to occur (Edwards et al., 2017; Mau-
rer, 2018). Absent an interested actor, a vulnerability
may continue to exist without any further repercussions.
Moreover, the successful exploitation of a vulnerabil-
ity also depends on the capabilities of both parties in-
volved. In the case of Stuxnet, significant resources were
invested to overcome the physical and technological bar-
riers raised to secure the targeted systems. Finally, the
consequences of such an interdependent and intercon-
nected system failing cannot be predicted beforehand
with absolute certainty (Perrow, 2011).
This depth of knowledge cannot be expected from
the average participant in Experiment 1. This results
in uncertainty that prompts the use of the representa-
tiveness heuristics. The results suggest that participants
attempted to find similarities between the events and
structures presented resulting in unsuitable stereotypes
being drawn between External and Internal events as
well as between these and their personal experiences
with cyberspace. Consequently, the behaviour observed
with non-experts confirms the assertions of Hypothe-
sis 1 that limited experience with cyber operations cre-
ates an environment of uncertainty that prompts the use
of heuristics.
7.3. A Brief Note on Domain Experts
As with the first experiment, the level of dread reflected
by experts does not appear to rise significantly above
the established baseline (x = 5.71). When treatment
groups are compared to the control, however, no statis-
tical difference is noted. This suggests that experts main-
tain a consistent perception of cyberspace regardless of
the treatment provided. This is corroborated by the fact
that neither External, Internal, or Trust had a statistically
significant impact on the outcome. This supports the ar-
gument that knowledgeable individualswould not create
inappropriate stereotypes and appears. Consequently,
this supports Hypothesis 2 which asserts that domain
knowledge would result in lower levels of dread given
the use of appropriate heuristics. However, it does not
allow us to rule out the use of goal-oriented motivations
as a means of maintaining bias-prone beliefs. Although
findings are inconclusive, it opens the possibility of fur-
ther inquiry into the decision-making processes used by
experts. Past research demonstrates that experts formu-
late sound judgementswhile utilizing cognitive shortcuts.
This, however, is dependent on the past information en-
vironment matching the present (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001).
The past decade has seen the growth of malicious in-
terstate activities in cyberspace. Yet the aggressive use of
these technologies existed long before events in Estonia
(i.e. 2007). The context, however, has changed. Although
the participants in Experiment 2 are most likely aware
of these developments, the body of knowledge they pos-
sess through their formal education was developed from
combating non-state actors13. While the authors are not
arguing that the current mechanisms in place are insuf-
ficient, the possibility exists that they are not the most
efficient and may limit the ability of states to act.
The inconclusive results of the second experiment
should not be treated as a failure. Rather, it serves to
inform future research how experiments involving do-
main experts ought to be designed. Specifically, it nar-
rows the factors that may serve to influence the quality
of expert judgements.
8. Tempering Bias and the Organization
The findings demonstrate that decision-makers can re-
sort to motivated reasoning when formulating judge-
ments regarding cyberspace. These tendencies have im-
plications in two related ambits: (a) the cost conse-
quences within the immediate context that decisions
must bemade, and (b) considerations for tempering bias
to minimize cost consequences.
8.1. Consequences for Mobilization due to Perceptions
of Dread
The context in which judgements regarding cyberspace
are made occur within specific institutional boundaries.
Policies are formed as a result of judgements undertaken
within an organized context. On that note, consequences
for this context are spread across two levels—the orga-
nization, and the state that the organization represents.
When decision-makers resort to intuitive thinking, the
probability that their perception of dread relative to a
specific cyber issue is reasonably congruent with the ac-
tual level of dread varies according to three likely scenar-
ios: (a) deflation, where the perceived threat is less than
the actual threat; (b) congruence, where the perceived
threat is congruent with the actual threat; and (c) infla-
tion, where the perceived threat is greater than the ac-
tual threat.
Consequently, any of the scenarios above can frame
the deployment of capabilities and tools in response to
13The curriculum used to teach Information Security in Computer Science departments is built on past efforts to combat hacking and cyber-crime. Frame-
works such as the (ISC)2 Common Body of Knowledge (Brecht, 2017) are examples of this. While some of the technical concepts are applicable to state
actors, the political context may be unique and requires additional insights beyond these frameworks.
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an impending event in the cyberspace (Dunn Cavelty,
2013). This has consequences for the resulting strategy
for mobilization, which in turn comes with costs incurred
by the organization.
As far as consequent mobilization strategies are con-
cerned, there are three possibilities. First, it can occur in
a form of a race to the extent that it may be intended as
an offensive position. Second, it can occur in a form that
meets the minimum capabilities necessary to be in a po-
sition of defence. Finally, it can occur in a manner where
base capabilities are developed for decreasing vulnera-
bilities and increasing resilience to potential attacks. The
underlying costs for the deployment of capabilities is a
complex feat because approximating the symmetry be-
tween the perceived threat and the actual threat is not
always optimal. An individual making the judgment who
is at the same in a position of authority may either over-
estimate or underestimate the threat and could, there-
fore, impose material and immaterial costs for both the
organization and the state.
Beyond theoretical assertions, the implications of
(in)correctly providing security assessments ought to be
considered considering the pace at which states are de-
veloping their respective cyber capabilities.While congru-
ence has long been the desired state, the inherent char-
acteristics of the domain compounds the persistent dif-
ficulty of assessing an adversary’s intent and capabilities
(Buchanan, 2017). The essential secrecy that obscures ca-
pabilities in cyberspace generates uncertainty on the part
of assessor states. In the absence of knowledge regarding
a potential adversary’s true capabilities, states are left to
form judgements based on past behaviour; judgements
which may, in themselves, be subject to bias.
Interestingly, the need for insight into a potential ad-
versary’s capabilities may itself lead to greater instability.
Regardless of whether a cyber operation is meant for in-
telligence gathering or as a first step of a larger offensive
campaign, unauthorized access to a secure system is nec-
essary. If discovered, the inherent characteristics of cy-
berspace do not permit the victim to determine which
of the two objectives led to this event. At this point, the
victim’s own pre-existing beliefs may determine its po-
tential response which could range from a tacit acknowl-
edgement of routine (and expected) espionage to one of
an escalatory spiral (Buchanan, 2017).
Consequently, the need for sufficient, if not optimal
judgement, is mandatory on both sides of an interstate
interaction. Parties must temper pre-existing beliefs to
avoid engaging in either provocative action (aggressor)
or unnecessary escalatory responses. Although the esca-
lation of hostilities into the physical domain is unlikely,
the disruption of cyberspace carries potential and avoid-
able costs.
8.2. Tempering Bias to Minimize Unnecessary Costs
This, in turn, begs the question: how can bias be tem-
pered to minimize the likelihood of accruing costs? Our
findings reveal the recurring use of heuristics at the in-
dividual level, which is critical because individuals who
respond to cyber operations are assumed to be in a posi-
tion of authority and able to make decisions which may,
in turn, have repercussions for the organizations and
states they represent. Indeed, judgments formed at the
individual level frame decisions, and in turn, incur cost
implications and related repercussions within the imme-
diate social context for which the decision-maker is un-
dertaking the decisions for. To this end, considerations
forminimizing costs at the organizational level which em-
anate from inaccurate judgments at the individual level
are inevitably linked with considerations for how micro-
level processes contribute to macro-level outcomes.
However, our findings are limited to the extent that
they do not consider the embeddedness of the individ-
ual within the organizational setting in undertaking de-
cisions. Considering that decisions pertaining to cyber
operations are undertaken within a context with insti-
tutional boundaries, it is possible that the direction of
effects of the inaccurate judgments on the organization
does not occur in one direction from the individual to the
organization. Instead, we posit the likelihood that the or-
ganizations which individuals represent also possess cer-
tain attributes that canmodulate individual biases. In the
study of organizations, these micro-macro process con-
siderations during uncertain contexts such as cyber op-
erations are reminiscent of sensemaking within organiza-
tions (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005), and how insti-
tutions enter the meaning-making processes of individu-
als in critical times (Weber & Glynn, 2006).
Sensemaking is broadly defined as a process by
which people seek to make plausible sense of ambigu-
ous, equivocal, or confusing issues and events (Brown,
Colville, & Pye, 2015; Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010) so as
to be able to mobilize an appropriate response (Weick
et al., 2005). Sensemaking has been studied particularly
within the context of crises and emergencies (Maitlis &
Sonenshein, 2010; Weick, 1993) where individual mem-
bers of an organization become suddenly faced with a
situation that is difficult to approximate with certainty,
while at the same time being constrained by both infor-
mation and time, as well as having to provide an imme-
diate justifiable response. Given that the findings of this
article infer the use of heuristics by individuals, it would
also be interesting to extend the investigation regarding
how intuitive judgements can be minimized during an
overall sensemaking process that involves various cues
from the organization that the individuals are a part of.
Note that sensemaking is a means by which individuals
are enabled to continuously stay in action amidst a dis-
ruptive shock (Weick et al., 2005) and to stay in action, in-
dividuals draw from certain “frameworks including insti-
tutional constraints, organizational premises, plans, ex-
pectations, acceptable justifications and traditions inher-
ited from predecessors” (Weick et al., 2005). In cyber op-
erations, asmuch as individuals with a position of author-
ity articulate a judgment, it is also important to consider
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the institutional boundaries that shapeways in which de-
cisions are made. Empirically, it would be interesting to
extend the experiment in a context where individuals are
exposed to interactions with other individuals with the
same organizational membership and see how such in-
teractions may either weaken or strengthen the extent
of ecological rationality in cyberspace operations.
Broadly, institutions influence the sense-making pro-
cess (Weber & Glynn, 2006). These institutional in-
fluences are exerted concretely through various ways
within the sensemaking process of the individual. For
example, institutions can affect individual sensemaking
through institutional policing, which may be embedded
in the structural hierarchies and command-and-control
approaches of the organization. This can be explored by
considering how structure, templates, and other mani-
festations of organizational control may affect the way
decision-makers in cyberspace make meaning. Sense-
making can also be triggered by the institution through
interactions within groups that are oriented towards a
specific organizational goal. Cyberspace operations are
presently deemed ubiquitous for purposes that involve
policy of the state, where conventions regarding its use
have yet to converge and be institutionalized. This has
an implication for the composition of groups involved in
cyberspace operations, namely, those with positions of
authority to enact certain policies related to cyberspace
have a variety of backgrounds and turf representations.
Future research may thus investigate how group com-
position, group dynamics, and group interaction among
various individuals with specific types of judgments and
biases can influence collective sensemaking, and ulti-
mately temper the perception of dread in cyberspace.
9. Conclusions
The phenomenon of dread in cyberspace is a conflu-
ence of the domain’s inherent characteristics and indi-
vidual cognitive processes. The complex interdependen-
cies within the domain generate a significant amount of
uncertainty regarding the consequences of cyber oper-
ations aimed at disrupting its routine operations. While
preventive measures may be taken to reduce its impact,
its true scope cannot be determined beforehand. Con-
sequently, individual decision-makers, particularly those
lacking experience, resort to similar (though possibly un-
related) events to form judgements regarding the situ-
ation at hand. This causes decision-makers fall into the
trap of finding correlations between events where none
exist, resulting in the use of strategies that are deemed
ecologically irrational. In doing so, the resulting judge-
ments may either overestimate or underestimate the
level of threat that can result in inappropriate policies
which can complicate existing interstate relations.
Tomitigate these issues, organizations towhich these
individuals belong should take appropriate steps to en-
courage accuracy-oriented reasoning on the part of
decision-makers. While this does not eliminate the in-
fluence of bias, it increases the likelihood that assess-
ments will be congruent to current realities. This mini-
mizes the likelihood that costs will be incurred through
the unnecessary development of capabilities or as the
consequences of escalation between parties.
Interstate interactions in cyberspace is an emergent
phenomenon that demands further analysis. While exist-
ing theories concerning material or systemic constraints
have proven useful, it is necessary to move towards
micro- and meso-level factors to better account for be-
haviour in this man-made domain. To this end, this ar-
ticle contributes to the on-going discourse by providing
the initial steps needed to strengthen this line of inquiry.
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